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Abstract 
Kovenock and Roberson’s (2010) paper has the potential to advance the research frontier, 
but has deficiencies. This paper suggests how Kovenock and Roberson’s (2010) paper 
can be developed into a more substantial paper. Kovenock and Roberson’s (2010) paper 
consists of three sections. The first section is an introduction which is OK but has no 
results. The second section, titled “Model and Main Result”, provides no contribution 
beyond Hausken (2008a). It consists of equations (1)-(10) which are equivalent to 
equations developed by Hausken (2008a), and equation (11) which is equivalent to the 
requirement u≥0 and U≥0 provided after equation (17) in Hausken (2008a). The third 
section quotes Hausken (2008a) once in one sentence which means that section 3 does 
not belong as a comment on the paper written by Hausken (2008a). The authors are 
encouraged to develop a new paper based on many interesting ideas in this note. The new 
paper should develop further the idea of mixed strategies presented in section 3. The new 
paper may be titled: “Strategic Defense and Attack for Series and Parallel Reliability 
Systems when Allowing Mixed Strategies”. 
 
1 Introduction 
Kovenock and Roberson (2010) have written a paper which comments on a paper written 
by Hausken (2008a). Kovenock and Roberson’s (2010) paper is a first step towards 
supplementing Hausken’s (2008a) work by allowing mixed strategies. The objectives of 
this paper are, first, to illustrate how Kovenock and Roberson’s (2010) approach can be 
extended to advance the research frontier. Second, we clarify a few misunderstandings in 
Kovenock and Roberson’s (2010) paper and show how there are no technical errors in 
Hausken’s (2008a) paper. Section 2 provides a systematic analysis referring to page 
numbers P and line numbers L in Kovenock and Roberson’s (2010) paper. Section 3 
concludes. 
 
2 Systematic analysis 
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1. P5,L40-44: The authors state: “Furthermore, it is incorrect to assert, as does Hausken 
(2008a), that if a player’s expected payoff given in (9) or (10) is negative, then there 
exists an equilibrium in which that player allocates…..”  
 
That statement is incorrect and should be removed. The term “equilibrium” is not present 
in Hausken’s (2008a) paper. After (17) Hausken (2008a) writes: 
 
“When (17) gives negative utilities, a corner solution emerges with zero utility and zero 
investment for that agent (either the defender or the attacker) which according to (17) 
would otherwise get negative utility. Using (12) or (13), the other agent gets a utility 
equal to the value of the system by investing arbitrarily small but positive amounts into 
defending or attacking the components.” 
 
As the authors correctly point out, the solution when (17) gives negative utilities is not a 
Nash equilibrium. The reason is that the defender can unilaterally and preferably deviate 
by choosing a strategy of investing more than the attacker. (The reason is not, as the 
authors state, that “the defender’s best response is to outbid the attacker,” since this is not 
a sequential game where the players can inch up on each other in sequential bidding. If 
the players were to outbid each other in sequential bidding, they would find no final 
resting point since no Nash equilibrium exists.) From a gametheoretic point of view, the 
issue boils down to specifying what happens in a simultaneous move game when no Nash 
equilibrium exists in pure strategies. This author thinks that the literature will certainly 
benefit from specifying the many solutions that may arise when a Nash equilibrium does 
not exist in pure strategies. Hausken’s (2008a) solution is one of many possible 
assumptions about what players may do when a Nash equilibrium does not exist in pure 
strategies. Another possible solution is that the attacker chooses an investment which 
makes the defender indifferent between choosing no investment and choosing a positive 
investment, both of which give zero utility to the defender. That solution is proposed by 
Hausken (2010b). 
 
For the event that the attacker moves first, that paper does not specify that the attacker 
chooses an arbitrarily small investment, since the defender will then not respond by 
choosing zero investment, but will respond by choosing a positive investment. In 
contrast, in that paper, the attacker, moving first, chooses a strictly positive investment 
which makes the defender, moving second, indifferent between choosing no investment 
and choosing a positive investment, both of which give zero utility to the defender. A 
third possible assumption about what players may do when a Nash equilibrium does not 
exist in pure strategies, is to use ideas from the gametheoretic bargaining literature in the 
1980s about “off-the-equilibrium-path conjectures”. As we know, infinitely many 
assumptions and solutions may be proposed for the event that no Nash equilibrium exists 
in pure strategies. See for example Rapoport and Guyer (1966) for non-existence of Nash 
equilibrium in pure strategies in 2 x 2 games: 
 
But, as we know, a Nash equilibrium always exists in mixed strategies. Hence a fourth 
possible assumption about what players may do when a Nash equilibrium does not exist 
in pure strategies, is to assume that the players may choose mixed strategies. I think the 
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current work initiated by the authors on mixed strategies can provide a useful addition to 
the literature. I encourage the authors to develop a new paper with such a focus. The 
paper can be titled: “Strategic Defense and Attack for Series and Parallel Reliability 
Systems when Allowing Mixed Strategies”. 
 
2.  P1,L24-28, abstract: The authors state: “This note identifies a technical error that 
invalidates Hausken’s characterization of Nash equilibrium for a substantial portion of 
the parameter space that he examines.….”  
 
That statement is incorrect and should be removed. There is no technical error in 
Hausken’s (2008a) paper. Hausken (2008a) provides a correct solution which is a Nash 
equilibrium in pure strategies when both players’ utilities are positive. For the event of 
negative utilities Hausken (2008a) provides one possible solution based on one of many 
possible assumptions about what players may do when a Nash equilibrium does not exist 
in pure strategies. The authors are advised to revise the statement as follows: “This paper 
supplements Hausken’s characterization of Nash equilibrium with a mixed strategy Nash 
equilibrium analysis for all parameter values, including that portion of the parameter 
space where no Nash equilibrium exists in pure strategies.” 
 
3. P1,L26: The authors state: “…substantial portion of the parameter space”. 
 
That statement is inappropriate and should be removed unless the authors can somehow 
quantify “substantial portion” and supplement with further reasoning about which 
parameter values are realistic. Empirical support is needed here, which neither Hausken 
(2008a) nor the authors provide. Assume that either expert judgment or empirical support 
or other tools is/are used to assess lower and upper limits for all parameters. Having 
established such ranges for all parameters, one can calculate which portion of these 
ranges corresponds to u≥0 and U≥0. That portion is a number between 0 and 1. With 
“substantial portion” the authors possibly mean that this number is above 0.5. If so, this 
author would like to see another argument than armchair reasoning for why this number 
is above 0.5. But, more importantly, regardless of whether or not this number is above or 
below 0.5, a crucial question is which parameter values are realistic.  If only 10% of the 
possible combinations of parameter values is/are realistic, the remaining 90% constitutes 
a substantial portion which is unrealistic. Let us illustrate with an example. Consider a 
network defended by a defender and attacked by an attacker. That no pure-strategy Nash 
equilibrium exists, which means that either u<0 or U<0, is quite a disastrous situation. 
For example, u<0 means that the parameter values are such that the defender cannot earn 
positive utility as no Nash equilibrium exists. From a common sense point of view that 
may be considered as an unrealistic situation, regardless of whether mi = 1 or mi ≠ 1. 
Quite the contrary, it may be argued that realistic situations are those where u>0 so that 
the defender has an incentive to defend the network. Let us further reflect on the case 
U<0. Many networks exist which are not attacked by an attacker, and hence U<0 may be 
realistic. This author considers it valuable that the authors analyze mixed strategy 
equilibria for the case that either u<0 or U<0 (and for the case u≥0 and U≥0). 
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4. P1,L24-29, abstract: The authors state: “….and provides necessary conditions for his 
solution to form a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.” 
 
That statement, which constitutes equation (11) in the authors’ Proposition 1, is correct, 
but is equivalent to requiring u≥0 and U≥0 in equation (17) in Hausken (2008a). Hence 
the insight has already been provided by Hausken (2008a). The case {u≥0 and U≥0} has 
to be distinguished from the case that either u<0 or U<0 as explained after equation (17) 
in Hausken (2008a). 
 
5. P1,L29-32, abstract: The authors state: “….Many of the existing results in the contest-
theoretic literature on the attack and defense of networks of targets rely upon 
Hausken’s (2008a) characterization and require corresponding parameter restrictions.” 
 
That statement should be reformulated since it is already known from the existing results 
in the contest-theoretic literature which parameter restrictions apply for the various 
solutions. The statement can be reformulated as follows: “This paper also supplements 
with a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium analysis for all parameter values the many results  
in the contest-theoretic literature on the attack and defense of networks that rely upon 
Hausken’s (2008a) characterization.” 
 
6. The last sentence in the authors’ abstract is correct and can be kept unchanged. 
 
7. P2,L37-41: The authors state: “In this comment we provide necessary conditions for 
the solution in Hausken (2008a) to form a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium point and 
show that these conditions are quite restrictive.” 
 
That statement is misleading and should be removed. The conditions for a pure-strategy 
Nash equilibrium has already been provided by Hausken (2008a) requiring u≥0 and U≥0 
after equation (17). Hausken’s (2008a) requirement u≥0 and U≥0 is equivalent to the 
authors’ equation (11) in the authors’ Proposition 1. The case {u≥0 and U≥0} has to be 
distinguished from the case that either u<0 or U<0 as explained after equation (17) in 
Hausken (2008a). When either u<0 or U<0, no Nash equilibrium exists in pure strategies. 
Regarding the restrictiveness of the conditions, please see elsewhere in this report. 
 
8. P2,L42-45: The authors state: “Section 2 reviews the characterization of equilibrium 
given by Hausken (2008a) and provides necessary conditions for the solution in 
Hausken (2008a) to form a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium point.” 
 
That statement should be removed since the necessary conditions have already been 
provided by Hausken (2008a) as u≥0 and U≥0, as stated after equation (17) in Hausken 
(2008a). These conditions are equivalent to the authors’ equation (11) and Proposition 1. 
 
9. P3,L19: The two words “Main Result” in this heading should be removed since there 
are no main results in this section 2. Equation (11) and Proposition 1 are equivalent to 
u≥0 and U≥0 provided by Hausken (2008a). 
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10. P3-6: The authors’ equations (1)-(10) are equivalent to equations developed by 
Hausken (2008a). The authors’ equation (11) is equivalent to the requirement u≥0 and 
U≥0 provided after equation (17) in Hausken (2008a). 
 
11. P6,L31-33: The authors state: “Therefore solving the system of first-order 
conditions, as does Hausken (2008a), does not guarantee equilibrium.” 
 
That statement is correct, but this is already known from Hausken (2008a) in the sense of 
distinguishing between u≥0 and U≥0 on the one hand and u<0 or U<0 on the other hand. 
The first-order conditions are solved only when u≥0 and U≥0, consistent with the 
statement after equation (17) in Hausken (2008a). When either u<0 or U<0, no Nash 
equilibrium exists in pure strategies, consistent with the statement after equation (17) in 
Hausken (2008a). 
 
12. P6,L44-55 and P7,L1-5: The authors discuss how restrictive the conditions u≥0 
and U≥0 are. For example, “pure-strategy equilibria may fail to exist even in the 
popular case of mi = 1 for all i.” I advise the authors to be careful with such armchair 
reasoning. Empirical support is needed to assess restrictiveness. Neither Hausken 
(2008a) nor the authors provide empirical support. That mi = 1 is popular is no 
argument one way or the other. But, we can make the following observations. 
Consider a network defended by a defender and attacked by an attacker. That no pure-
strategy Nash equilibrium exists, which means that either u<0 or U<0, is quite a 
disastrous situation. For example, u<0 means that the parameter values are such that 
the defender cannot earn positive utility based on pure strategies as no Nash 
equilibrium exists in pure strategies. From a common sense point of view that may be 
considered as an unrealistic situation, regardless of whether mi = 1 or mi ≠ 1. Quite the 
contrary, it may be argued that realistic situations are those where u>0 so that the 
defender has an incentive to defend the network. Let us further reflect on the case 
U<0. Many networks exist which are not attacked by an attacker, and hence U<0 may 
be realistic. I consider it valuable and encourage the authors to analyze mixed strategy 
equilibria also for the case that either u<0 or U<0. 
 
13. P7,L6-16: The authors state: “Because the solution in Hausken (2008a) forms a 
pure-strategy Nash equilibrium point only for a restrictive set of parameters, 
statements that are based on this solution — such as all of the propositions in Hausken 
(2008a) — fail to hold for all combinations of mi, vA, vD, cA,i and cD,i that violate either 
of the two conditions in Proposition 1.” 
 
That statement should be removed since this is already known from Hausken (2008a). Of 
course all the propositions in Hausken (2008a) hold only when u≥0 and U≥0, consistent 
with the statement after equation (17) in Hausken (2008a). Yes, combinations of mi, vA, 
vD, cA,i and cD,i that violate u≥0 and U≥0 cause all the propositions in Hausken (2008a) to 
be invalid, consistent with what is already known from Hausken (2008a). 
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14. P7,L17-19: The authors state: “There are a number of articles that analyze 
variations of the Hausken (2008a) framework that are also erroneous without the 
imposition of more restrictive parameter assumptions.” 
 
That statement is incorrect and should be removed. Hausken (2008a) has already 
provided the parameter assumptions as u≥0 and U≥0 after equation (17). Hence nothing 
is erroneous. 
 
15. P7,L20-23: The authors state: “First, both Hausken (2008b) and Hausken (2010a) 
contain closely related technical errors that invalidate those characterizations of Nash 
equilibrium for a substantial portion of the parameter space. 
 
That statement is incorrect and should be removed. There are no technical errors in 
Hausken (2008b) and Hausken (2010a). It is clear from those papers when the results are 
valid, for example when u≥0 and U≥0 or when the players earn higher utilities than their 
security values. 
 
16. P7,L23-24: The authors state: “…substantial portion of the parameter space”. 
 
That statement is inappropriate and should be removed as discussed in point 3 above. 
 
17. P7,L24-32: The authors state: “In particular, in both of those games each of the 
players has a secure utility that can be assured regardless of the action of the other 
player. But in the solutions that are given Hausken (2008b) and Hausken (2010a) there 
exist large portions of the parameter space in which one or both of the players obtain a 
level of utility that is below their secure utility level, and hence these solutions do not 
form pure-strategy equilibria.” 
 
That’s correct but this is already known from Hausken (2008b) and Hausken (2010a). 
When the players earn utilities that are below their secure utilities, these solutions do not 
form pure-strategy equilibria. 
 
18. P7,L33-54: The authors correctly quote a part of Hausken’s (2008a) Proposition 
and add: “Unfortunately, there are a number of papers that, relying on Hausken 
(2008a), incorrectly assume that when cA,i = cA, cD,i = cD, and mi = m for all 
components i =1, . . . , n, it is optimal for each player to allocate forces evenly across 
components.” 
 
That statement is incorrect and should be removed. Hausken’s (2008a) Proposition 1 is 
correct and applies when u≥0 and U≥0 which specify the parameter restrictions needed 
for a pure strategy Nash equilibrium to exist. Consequently, when u≥0 and U≥0, the 
result /i it c r = /i iT C R  follows as an implication. That result is correct and independent of 
m. It is certainly not correct to state that cA,i = cA, cD,i = cD, and mi = m for all components 
i =1, . . . , n imply /i it c r = /i iT C R . This author is not aware of any papers that, relying on 
Hausken (2008a), claim the implication in the previous sentence. Applying a mixed 
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strategy equilibrium analysis, I hope the authors can develop expressions for the case that 
either u<0 or U<0. 
 
19. P8,L11-12: The authors state: “It is beyond the scope of this comment to provide 
necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium 
with an even allocation of forces that is assumed in all of these articles. However, it is 
straightforward to modify the necessary conditions given in Proposition 1 above for 
each of those particular models.” 
 
That statement should be modified since conditions such as u≥0 and U≥0 are already 
clear from those papers. But, in future work, I hope the authors can determine mixed 
strategy equilibria for each of these models. Yes, this author considers “the 
completion of this equilibrium characterization as an important area for future research.” 
 
20. P8-10: Much, but not all, of section 3 “Mixed-Strategy Equilibria” consists of 
quotes of earlier research. Section 3 contains many interesting ideas that can be 
developed into one or several separate future papers. Section 3 quotes Hausken 
(2008a) once in one sentence which means that section 3 does not belong as a 
comment on the paper written by Hausken (2008a). 
 
21. P8,L40-43: The authors state: “assume that for each player the unit costs are 
symmetric across targets and players and are normalized to one (i.e., cA,i = cD,i = 1 for 
all i) and that the level of noise at each target is the same (i.e., mi = m for all i).” 
 
I recommend that the authors write a future paper where those restrictive assumptions are 
generalized maximally. 
 
22. P10,L4-8: The authors state: “However, there is good reason to believe that cases 
involving finite but high m are qualitatively closer to this benchmark than to the pure-
strategy profiles examined in Hausken (2008a).” 
 
This is the only quote of Hausken (2008a) in section 3. This author is not convinced by 
the authors’ armchair reasoning about how pure-strategy profiles examined by Hausken 
(2008a) and others are close or not close to one or the other benchmark. Empirical 
support is needed. Pure-strategy profiles are indeed common. A government seeking to 
protect a network, and a terrorist seeking to attack a network, can be expected first to 
search for pure-strategy profiles, and thereafter to search for mixed-strategy profiles. 
Hausken and Levitin (2008) and Hirshleifer (1995) assess the issue of low versus high 
decisiveness parameter or contest intensity m. 
 
23. P10,L4-8: The authors state: “A complete treatment of simultaneous move games 
of attack and defense in which the conditions in equation (11) are violated is still an 
open question.” 
 
I hope the authors will write a future paper where this open question is fully and 
exhaustively answered. That the conditions in equation (11) are violated means that we 
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no longer have u≥0 and U≥0 in Hausken’s (2008a) equation (17). Hausken (2008a) 
provides one possible suggestion for how the players may handle the event that either 
u<0 or U<0. That suggestion can well be argued to be plausible (the player earning 
negative utility simply withdraws leaving everything else to the other player), but this 
suggested solution is not a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium since no pure-strategy Nash 
equilibrium exists when either u<0 or U<0. An exhaustive analysis of the event that 
either u<0 or U<0 would be a valuable addition to the literature. For example, networks 
are often defended but not always attacked. This may suggest that the event U<0 is 
common. Understanding that event exhaustively will certainly be valuable for e.g. a 
defending government which then gets insight into how to deter attackers. 
 
24. P10,L11-12: The authors state: “However, we do know that for a single contest 
with linear costs, (the famous Tullock rent-seeking model), a pure-strategy 
equilibrium exists only for m less than or equal to 2.” 
 
To supplement this insight, assuming unitary actors, Hirshleifer (1995:33) derives two 
conditions under which anarchy breaks down. The first is that “an excessively large 
decisiveness parameter m (i.e. m   >   1) leads to dynamic instability, that is, movement 
toward a corner solution” where one actor gets the entire product, and the other gets 
nothing. “ 
 
Hirshleifer, J. (1995) Anarchy and Its Breakdown. Journal of Political Economy 103(1) 
26-52. 
 
In contrast, accounting for the collective action problem within each group, Hausken 
(2006) develops the opposite result: fighting/production is stable even for large 
decisiveness parameters (above one) and strict income requirements for each agent. 
 
Hausken, K. (2006), “The Stability of Anarchy and Breakdown of Production,” Defence 
and Peace Economics 17, 6, 589-603. 
 
25. P10,L22-25: The authors state: “Unfortunately, the nonexistence of pure-strategy 
equilibrium and characterization of mixed-strategy equilibria has been almost entirely 
overlooked in the contest-theoretic literature on attack and defense of networks of 
targets.” 
 
This author agrees and hopes that the authors will write a future paper to remedy this 
deficiency. 
 
26. P10,L25-28: The authors state: “In fact, as shown in Proposition 1, the pure-
strategy equilibria applied extensively in the literature exist only for a very restrictive 
set of parameters.” 
 
The statement about restrictiveness is misleading and should be rewritten in accordance 
with points about restrictiveness made elsewhere in this report. 
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27. P10,L25-28: The authors state: “This characterization remains an important area 
for future research.” 
 
Yes, this author agrees and hopes the authors will conduct future research on this 
characterization. 
 
28. The possibility that either u<0 or U<0 may occur, which implies that no Nash 
equilibrium exists in pure strategies, is one reason that many of the papers the authors 
list in the reference list do not solve for a Nash equilibrium, but analyze a two period 
minmax game where the defender moves in the first period minimizing for example 
the vulnerability of a system, while the attacker moves in the second period 
maximizing the vulnerability. 
 
3 Conclusion 
Kovenock and Roberson’s (2010) paper has the potential to advance the research frontier, 
but has deficiencies. This paper suggests how Kovenock and Roberson’s (2010) paper 
can be developed into a more substantial paper. Kovenock and Roberson’s (2010) paper 
consists of three sections. The first section is an introduction which is OK but has no 
results. The second section, titled “Model and Main Result”, provides no contribution 
beyond Hausken (2008a). It consists of equations (1)-(10) which are equivalent to 
equations developed by Hausken (2008a), and equation (11) which is equivalent to the 
requirement u≥0 and U≥0 provided after equation (17) in Hausken (2008a). The third 
section quotes Hausken (2008a) once in one sentence which means that section 3 does 
not belong as a comment on the paper written by Hausken (2008a). The authors are 
encouraged to develop a new paper based on many interesting ideas in this note. The new 
paper should develop further the idea of mixed strategies presented in section 3. The new 
paper may be titled: “Strategic Defense and Attack for Series and Parallel Reliability 
Systems when Allowing Mixed Strategies”. 
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